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793 
THROWING A TOY WRENCH IN THE  
“GREATEST LEGAL ENGINE”: CHILD WITNESSES  
AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cross-examination of witnesses has often been called the “greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”1 Enshrined in the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment,
2
 this most basic feature of 
an adversarial legal system guarantees criminal defendants the right to 
have the prosecution’s witnesses testify in open court and the opportunity 
to question said witnesses in front of the jury.
3
 Cross-examination is 
premised on the idea that face-to-face confrontation in open court between 
these witnesses and the defendant provides the strongest assurance of 
accurate testimony and, consequently, of protecting defendants from 
unjust convictions.
4
 Through cross-examination, a defendant can introduce 
facts from the witness not raised on direct examination and challenge the 
credibility of that witness, both of which are relevant to a jury’s 
determination of guilt.
5
 In this way, cross-examination facilitates the fact-
finding purpose of criminal trials. The importance of this right to the 
United States criminal justice system cannot be questioned.
6
 
 
 
 1. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 5 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1367 (James H. 
Chabourn ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1974); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (quoting 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)) (describing cross-examination of witnesses as “the 
‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’”). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
 3. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (“[The Confrontation Clause] intends to 
secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only 
such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give 
to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination.”). 
 4. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (“There is doubtless reason for saying that 
the accused should never lose the benefit of [personal examination and cross-examination of the 
witness] . . . and that, if notes of [the witness’s] testimony are permitted to be read, [the accused] is 
deprived of the advantage of that personal presence of the witness before the jury which the law has 
designed for his protection.”). 
 5. Id. at 242–43 (“The primary object of the constitutional provision . . . in which the accused 
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of 
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his 
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of 
belief.”). 
 6. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) (“There are few subjects, perhaps, upon 
which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief 
that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for 
the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal.”). 
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The premise underlying this “greatest legal engine” is challenged, 
however, when children are the “witnesses against”7 the defendant. Social 
science and psychological research in recent decades suggest that cross-
examination of child witnesses could actually interfere with the discovery 
of truth. A lesser capacity for recalling past events, a lack of understanding 
of the criminal justice system, and the trauma of testifying in court all 
raise concerns about the accuracy of child testimony compared to that of 
adults.
8
 Of perhaps the greatest concern, research continually shows that 
children can be highly suggestible,
9
 making leading questions—a common 
tactic during cross-examination—particularly dangerous in the case of 
child witnesses. While cross-examination can be used to elicit the truth 
from adversary witnesses, the same suggestive techniques could 
manipulate vulnerable children to testify to just the opposite.
10
 
This Note explores this contradiction: the Confrontation Clause, 
constitutionalizing the right of cross-examination to ensure that 
convictions are based solely on accurate and reliable testimony, requires, if 
read literally, that child witnesses submit to a procedure which could 
undermine that very purpose.
11
 The history and purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause suggest that cross-examination is not required in 
those circumstances. In the case of child witnesses, modern Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence should take into account public policy concerns 
regarding the development of children and permit the admission of 
hearsay—testimony regarding a child’s statements from someone other 
than the child—where cross-examination would not advance the fact-
 
 
 7.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 8. See infra Part III.B–E. 
 9. This Note refers to the term “suggestibility” as the quality of being more easily influenced 
and more inclined to accept what another says as true. For a more in-depth discussion of suggestibility 
in children, see infra Part III.C.  
 10. Professor Frank Vandervort has astutely pointed out that John Henry Wigmore, originator of 
the “greatest legal engine” phrase, himself recognized the inherent dangers of cross-examination. 
Frank E. Vandervort, A Search for the Truth or Trial by Ordeal: When Prosecutors Cross-Examine 
Adolescents How Should Courts Respond?, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 335, 335 (2010). Following his 
famous quote, Wigmore wrote, “A lawyer can do anything with cross-examination . . . . He may, it is 
true, do more than he ought to do; he . . . may make the truth appear like falsehood.” WIGMORE, supra 
note 1, § 1367, at 32 (quoted in Vandervort, supra, at 335).  
 11. Many scholars have explored how child witnesses may not produce reliable answers when 
subjected to cross-examination or suggestive questioning techniques. See infra Part III.B–E. In 
particular, Professor Vandervort’s article discussing the use of suggestive or aggressive cross-
examination techniques by prosecutors on adolescent defense witnesses provides a particularly helpful 
background for this topic. See generally Vandervort, supra note 10. This Note attempts to situate this 
and similar research within the context of the Confrontation Clause and argues that the Constitution 
does not absolutely require confrontation in instances where the testimony elicited would not be 
reliable.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/9
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finding goals of a criminal trial. In short, children should not be treated as 
adults for purposes of confrontation. At the same time, this Note does not 
propose doing away with cross-examination of child witnesses altogether 
and should not be read as minimizing the importance of cross-examination 
to American criminal justice. However, it is important to recognize the oft-
documented risks associated with children undergoing cross-examination. 
Amidst this backdrop, this Note makes the modest claim that the 
Constitution does not necessarily impose a categorical requirement that 
child witnesses, just as adults, testify and be subject to cross-examination.  
This Note starts, in Part II, by discussing the history, purpose, and 
scope of the constitutional right of confrontation. Particular attention is 
given to the longstanding purpose of the Confrontation Clause: ensuring 
the reliability of evidence put before the trier of fact. In 2004, the Supreme 
Court decided Crawford v. Washington,
12
 which represented a momentous 
change in Confrontation Clause analysis. But while the Clause’s 
jurisprudence has shifted, its underlying purpose has remained the same. 
Part III begins with a brief history of its own—that of the use of child 
witnesses during and since the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. This 
survey shows that, throughout United States history, courts have almost 
always treated children as exceptional. This Part ends with child witnesses 
today and what psychological research tells us about the validity of child 
testimony under the rigors of cross-examination. Part IV explores the 
treatment of children in state courts before and after Crawford and shows 
that, despite much scholarship devoted to the contrary, children’s out-of-
court statements, just as those by adults, are generally barred under the 
Supreme Court’s new rule. Part V makes the argument that the 
Confrontation Clause, and the Constitution in general, does not require 
strict enforcement where its purpose would be undermined. The difficult 
balance to be struck between the value of cross-examination and risks of 
confronting child witnesses is raised, and other practical solutions to this 
problem are also explored. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
An initial discussion of the historical purpose and scope of the 
Confrontation Clause serves two purposes. First, this history demonstrates 
that the longstanding, recognized purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to 
ensure the reliability of evidence before the trier of fact in criminal 
 
 
 12. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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proceedings. Despite the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential shift—from 
treating the Confrontation Clause as a substantive guarantee to merely a 
procedural one—in Crawford v. Washington, this underlying purpose 
remains the same. Second, rooted in this traditional purpose is the idea that 
the constitutional right of confrontation may give way to overriding 
concerns of public policy. The lessons of this history are that the 
Confrontation Clause has never been read to categorically require 
confrontation in all cases and the Clause’s requirements should be 
determined in light of its underlying purpose.  
A. The History and Purpose of the Confrontation Clause 
Justice Harlan famously wrote that the Confrontation Clause “comes to 
us on faded parchment.”13 What Justice Harlan meant, and what 
subsequent justices and scholars have echoed, is that the history of the 
Confrontation Clause provides little insight into its meaning.
14
 Neither the 
recorded debates at the Constitutional Convention,
15
 nor other historical 
documents from the Framing period,
16
 provide much guidance. Despite 
this dearth of historical evidence, the Supreme Court—most recently in 
Crawford itself—has generally traced the roots of the Confrontation 
Clause to English common law. In particular, the American right of 
confrontation emerged in response to the civil-law method of deposing 
witnesses ex parte before trial and admitting affidavits of their statements 
in lieu of live testimony.
17
 Under this school of thought, the Sixth 
 
 
 13. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 14. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result); Green, 399 
U.S. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361–62 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 15. Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1004–
05 (2003) (concluding that the Confrontation Clause was only “briefly discussed” prior to its adoption 
based on records of the Convention).  
 16. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 
RUTGERS L.J. 77, 77 (1995); Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for 
Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 35–40 (2005). 
 17. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused.”); Green, 399 U.S. at 156 (“[T]he particular vice that 
gave impetus to the confrontation claim was the practice of trying defendants on ‘evidence’ which 
consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions secured by the examining magistrates, thus 
denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser in a face-to-face encounter in front of 
the trier of fact.”); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (“The primary object of the 
constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were 
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination 
and cross-examination of the witness . . . .”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/9
  
 
 
 
 
2015]  THROWING A TOY WRENCH IN THE “GREATEST LEGAL ENGINE” 797 
 
 
 
 
Amendment incorporated English common law as it existed at the writing 
of the Bill of Rights and was intended to ensure defendants had a right of 
confrontation for certain prosecution witnesses.
18
 Still, this historical 
account as a basis for Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is not without 
critics and detractors.
19
 
Historical ambiguity aside, the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability 
of evidence before the trier of fact in criminal trials. The right of 
confrontation does so in two ways.
20
 First, confrontation serves a 
functional purpose: ensuring the accuracy of the fact-finding process and 
protecting criminal defendants from unjust convictions.
21
 The Supreme 
Court has long documented the practical benefits of confrontation:  
 
 
 18. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Crawford provides the most succinct account of this 
history. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–50. Of note, the majority in that case asserted that the right of 
confrontation “is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, 
admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” Id. at 54; see also Mattox, 
156 U.S. at 243 (“We are bound to interpret the constitution in light of the law as it existed at the time 
it was adopted . . . .”). While the premise that the Sixth Amendment be read in reference to Framing-
era law is fairly noncontroversial, the implications of this premise are much less so. See infra note 27. 
 19. Numerous historians and constitutional scholars have criticized the history outlined in 
Crawford. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s “Cross-
Examination Rule”: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557 (2007) (arguing that framing-era 
evidence law focused on oath, not hearsay, for admissibility); Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the 
Framers Know, and When Did They Know It?: Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 105, 117–18 (2005) (criticizing some cases relied upon by the majority in Crawford); 
Jonakait, supra note 16, at 81 (arguing that the Confrontation Clause constitutionalized the adversarial 
procedure developing in the states following the American Revolution, not English common law); 
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. 
L. REV. 219 (2005) (rejecting idea that English common law had the right of confrontation at time 
Sixth Amendment adopted); Kirst, supra note 16, at 38–39 (same). Even other Justices on the Supreme 
Court have taken issue with Justice Scalia’s historical analysis. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69–73 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); White, 502 U.S. at 359–66 (Thomas, J., concurring); Green, 399 U.S. at 
175–79 (Harlan, J., concurring). Whether these criticisms are meritorious is outside the scope of this 
note. For purposes of this discussion, this debate is important simply to show that the current 
Confrontation Clause standard set forth in Crawford is far from a foregone conclusion. Moreover, 
disagreement on a proper historical account of the right of confrontation adds weight to the conclusion 
that courts should look to the overall purpose of the Confrontation Clause as a primary source of 
interpretation. 
 20. The Supreme Court has recognized two purposes of confrontation: one functional and other 
symbolic. Barbara Brook Snyder, Defining the Contours of Unavailability and Reliability for the 
Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 189, 190 (1993). 
 21. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987) (“The right to cross-examination, 
protected by the Confrontation Clause, thus is essentially a “functional” right designed to promote the 
reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial.”); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) 
(referring to the Confrontation Clause’s “underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding 
process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence”); Dutton v. Evans, 400 
U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (“The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the Confrontation 
Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal 
trials . . . .”); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (“[The Confrontation Clause] was 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements 
under oath—thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter 
and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for 
perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the 
‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’; 
(3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe 
the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the 
jury in assessing his credibility.
22
 
In theory, witnesses are more likely to testify truthfully—and jurors better 
able to judge the truthfulness of witnesses—if they are required to testify 
in court, under oath, and in front of the jury and defendant. Cross-
examination allows defendants to sift the conscience of witnesses, expose 
weaknesses in their testimony, and pose questions unasked on direct 
examination.
23
 In short, confrontation advances the goals of the criminal 
process itself: discovering the truth and accurately determining the 
innocence or guilt of criminal defendants. Second, the Confrontation 
Clause serves the symbolic purpose of ensuring seemingly fair and even-
handed criminal prosecutions.
24
 Permitting confrontation of prosecution 
witnesses allows defendants an opportunity to fully defend against their 
charges and avoids the impression that defendants are convicted through 
the secrecy and conniving of the government. These twin goals 
demonstrate that the primary concern of the Confrontation Clause is the 
reliability of evidence.
25
 Crawford and its progeny have not altered that 
focus.
26
  
 
 
intended to . . . preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of 
the right of cross-examination.”). 
 22. Green, 399 U.S. at 158. 
 23. See, e.g., Stincer, 482 U.S. at 736 (“The opportunity for cross-examination, protected by the 
Confrontation Clause, is critical for ensuring the integrity of the fact-finding process.”); Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (“Cross-examination is the principal means by which the 
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 
404 (1965)) (“[T]here is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation 
between accused and accuser as ‘essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.’”); Lee v. Illinois, 
476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (“[T]he right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses contributes to 
the establishment of a system of criminal justice in which the perception as well as the reality of 
fairness prevails. . . . The Confrontation Clause advances these goals by ensuring that convictions will 
not be based on charges of unseen and unknown—and hence unchallengeable—individuals.”). 
 25. This is not to say there is unanimous agreement about the purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause. See, e.g., Jonakait, supra note 16, at 82 (proposing that the purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause was to ensure effective defense advocacy in a developing American adversarial system); Roger 
C. Park, Purpose as a Guide to the Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
297, 298 (2005) (arguing that the Clause’s purpose is to prevent state abuse of power via undue 
influencing of witnesses); but see Paul L. Schechtman, From Reliability to Uncertainty: Difficulties 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/9
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B. The Right of Confrontation 
Exactly what the right of confrontation guarantees is another source of 
debate. The muddled history of the Confrontation Clause raises the same 
problems here.
27
 The language of the Clause does little else to clarify its 
meaning. Tucked amidst other so-called trial rights of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Clause reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”28 Read literally, the Clause says nothing about hearsay. It requires 
nothing more than for prosecution witnesses who do actually testify to do 
so in a particular way—in court and subject to cross-examination by the 
defendant. The Supreme Court, however, has consistently held that the 
Constitution provides greater protection than this narrow view.
29
 On the 
other hand, the Court has likewise rejected a broad interpretation, which 
would require all witnesses against the defendant to be present and testify 
at trial, as too extreme.
30
 
The Supreme Court has characterized the Confrontation Clause as 
creating two substantive rights.
31
 First, the Confrontation Clause grants 
 
 
Inherent in Interpreting and Applying the New Crawford Standard, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 305, 305 
(2005) (advocating for reliability to remain the touchstone of Confrontation Clause analysis). Two 
responses come to mind. First, these additional or alternative purposes of the Confrontation Clause are 
not necessarily inconsistent with the purpose of reliability. Reliable evidence certainly goes hand-in-
hand with ensuring effective criminal defense and creating a check on government prosecution. 
Second, a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that, though these goals are relevant, the 
primary concern of the Confrontation Clause is the reliability of evidence in criminal proceedings. See 
supra notes 21–23. 
 26. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is 
to ensure reliability of evidence . . . .”). 
 27. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Not “the Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban 
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford–Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the 
Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 351–52 (2007) (suggesting that the admissibility 
of out-of-court statements in Framing-Era courts depended on whether a declarant was sworn and 
under oath, not whether the statement was hearsay); Randolph N. Jonakait, The (Futile) Search for a 
Common Law Right of Confrontation: Beyond Brasier’s Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant American 
Cases, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 471 (2007) (arguing that the cases relied upon in Crawford do not show that 
there was any general prohibition on hearsay at common law when the Sixth Amendment was 
adopted). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 29. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 360 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  
 30. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (“If one were to read this language literally, it 
would require, on objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant not present at trial. 
But, if thus applied, the Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected 
as unintended and too extreme.”). 
 31. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (“The Confrontation Clause provides 
two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against 
him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.”); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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defendants the literal right to confront adverse witnesses—for the witness 
to be present in court and to testify in front of the defendant and jury.
32
 It 
is this right which is most consistent with the text of the Clause itself.
33
 
Literal confrontation advances the fact-finding purpose of the criminal 
process in ways described above—testimony under oath, in the presence 
of the defendant, and under observation by the fact-finder.
34
 But beyond a 
literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court has 
long recognized that the Sixth Amendment also guarantees defendants a 
right to cross-examine said witnesses.
35
 This right further fulfills the goals 
of face-to-face confrontation by allowing defendants the opportunity to 
test the evidence against them.  
Controversy surrounding the Confrontation Clause, however, is less 
about what confrontation requires but rather when it is required. Of most 
concern to this Note is whether the Confrontation Clause permits 
hearsay—testimony from a third party as to the out-of-court statements of 
a nontestifying witness. As the admission of hearsay necessarily does 
away with some or all of the elements of confrontation, this issue has been 
a fundamental question of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
C. Roberts Reliability Doctrine 
For decades before Crawford, the Supreme Court conceptualized the 
Confrontation Clause as a substantive guarantee of the reliability of 
evidence—more than simply a procedural requirement.36 The Court 
 
 
(referring to both “personal examination” and “cross-examination” as rights associated with 
confrontation). 
 32. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (“We have never doubted, therefore, that the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before 
the trier of fact.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (“Our own decisions seem to have 
recognized at an early date that it is this literal right to “confront” the witness at the time of trial that 
forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.”). 
 33. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29. 
 34. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 35. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55 (2004); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 
418 (1965) (“Our cases construing the clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of 
cross-examination . . . .”); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (“It cannot seriously be doubted 
at this late date that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal 
case to confront the witnesses against him.”). 
 36. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213–14 (1972) (allowing admission of witness 
testimony from a prior trial because it was sufficiently reliable and the defendant’s attorney had an 
opportunity to cross-examine at that trial); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88–89 (1970) (allowing a 
witness to testify regarding a coconspirator’s statements while in prison because they bore indicia of 
reliability); Green, 399 U.S. at 155 (describing the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules as 
concerned with the reliability of out-of-court statements). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/9
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articulated this view in Ohio v. Roberts.
37
 Confrontation and cross-
examination, according to Roberts, were necessary insofar as they ensured 
that only the most reliable, accurate evidence be used against criminal 
defendants at trial. If a statement was sufficiently reliable such that cross-
examination of a witness was unnecessary, then the Confrontation Clause 
did not require it.
38
 Confrontation was not constitutionally required if two 
conditions were met.
39
 First, the prosecution must “either produce, or 
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes 
to use against the defendant.”40 Second, if the declarant was found to be 
unavailable, an out-of-court statement was admissible “only if it bears 
adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”41 Roberts’s two-prong test, then, 
generally tracked modern evidence law;
42
 hearsay was inadmissible if the 
statement was too unreliable. Only then would witnesses be required to 
testify and submit to cross-examination at trial. In this way, the 
Confrontation Clause provided a substantive guarantee that only reliable 
hearsay would be admitted against criminal defendants.  
Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court has never held the right 
of confrontation to be absolute. As far back as Mattox v. United States,
43
 
 
 
 37. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 38. See id. at 64–65 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The Court, however, 
has recognized that competing interests, if closely examined, may warrant dispensing with 
confrontation at trial. Significantly, every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law 
enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence applicable in 
criminal proceedings.”). 
 39.  Id. at 65–66. 
 40. Id. at 65. The Court in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), and subsequently in 
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), limited Roberts to its facts and held that unavailability was not 
an absolute requirement under Roberts. Statements falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception did 
not require such a finding to be admitted through another witness. White, 502 U.S. at 355–57; Inadi, 
475 U.S. at 396.  
 41. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The Court described two kinds of statements which bore adequate 
indicia of reliability: statements falling into a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or those 
demonstrating “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id.  
 42. The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to debunk a one-to-one relationship between 
the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) 
(“Although we have recognized that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed 
to protect similar values, we have also been careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause’s 
prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements.”); Green, 399 U.S. 
at 155–56 (“While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are 
generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is 
complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of 
hearsay and their exceptions. . . . The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in 
violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that 
confrontation rights have been denied.”). Legal historians generally support this distinction as well. 
See, e.g., Davies, supra note 27, at 351–52 (explaining that hearsay rules and exceptions in evidence 
law developed only after the Sixth Amendment was adopted). 
 43.  156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
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one of the first seminal Confrontation Clause decisions, the Court 
recognized that public policy could trump confrontation rights,
44
 and the 
Court has cited public policy to justify some common law hearsay 
exceptions as incorporated into the Sixth Amendment.
45
 Decisions since 
have echoed that idea.
46
 Roberts, itself, was premised on a constitutional 
“preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,” not a requirement.47 In 
sum, Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of admitting 
hearsay without confrontation have supported the premise that the 
Confrontation Clause countenances policy considerations, particularly 
where that hearsay is deemed reliable. 
A noteworthy example is Maryland v. Craig,
48
 in which the Court 
upheld as constitutional the use of closed-circuit television to present the 
testimony of an alleged child sex abuse victim.
49
 The Court in Craig ruled 
that face-to-face confrontation at trial, though a constitutional right under 
the Sixth Amendment, could be denied where necessary to further an 
important public policy interest—in this case the protection of child sexual 
abuse victims from the trauma of testifying.
50
 In particular, the Court 
 
 
 44. See id. at 243 (“But general rules of law of this kind, however beneficient in their operation 
and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the 
necessities of the case.”) 
 45. See Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (“As examples [of exceptions] are 
cases where the notes of testimony of deceased witness, of which the accused has had the right of 
cross-examination in a former trial . . . . Documentary evidence to establish collateral facts admissible 
under the common law, may be admitted.”); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243–44 (“We are bound to interpret 
the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted . . . . For instance, there 
could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the provision in question than the admission of 
dying declarations. . . . [Y]et from time immemorial they have been treated as competent testimony, 
and no one would have the hardihood at this day to question their admissibility.”). 
 46. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (“[T]he right to confront and to 
cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate 
interests in the criminal trial process.”); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 79 (1970). 
 47. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.  
 48. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).  
 49. Id. at 857. In Craig, the defendant Sandra Ann Craig was charged with abusing a six-year-old 
girl who attended a kindergarten center operated by Craig. Id. at 840. The prosecution invoked a 
Maryland statute which allowed a procedure by which a child witness alleged to be the victim of child 
abuse could testify from a room outside the courtroom via a one-way closed circuit television. Id. The 
child witness, prosecutor, and defense counsel would withdraw to a separate room to conduct the 
interview while the judge, jury, and defendant viewed the testimony from a video monitor in the 
courtroom. Id. at 841. 
 50. Id. at 850. The Maryland statute required the judge, before allowing the alternative 
procedure, to make a finding that “testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will result in the 
child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.” Id. at 
841. The Supreme Court distinguished the situation in Craig from that in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 
(1988). In Coy, the Court found unconstitutional the placement of a screen between the defendant and 
child sexual assault victims during testimony. Id. at 1022. The children could be interviewed and 
cross-examined at trial but could not see the defendant nor be seen by the jury. Id. The Iowa statute in 
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found that the child’s testimony was sufficiently reliable because only one 
element of confrontation—testifying in the presence of the defendant—
was absent. The child witness was otherwise subject to cross-examination, 
under oath, and viewable by the jury.
51
 Craig is important for two reasons. 
First, the majority in Craig recognized that concerns particular to child 
witnesses were relevant and important to Confrontation Clause analysis. 
Indeed, the Court, in other areas of constitutional law, has long 
acknowledged the developmental differences distinguishing children and 
adults.
52
 Second, Craig stands for the proposition that the Confrontation 
Clause must be interpreted “in a manner sensitive to its purposes and 
sensitive to the necessities of trial and the adversary process.”53 Though 
Craig concerned only the face-to-face element of confrontation,
54
 the 
Court’s concerns with the reliability of evidence and problems of child 
witnesses apply equally to the admission of child hearsay. 
D. Crawford Testimonial Hearsay 
The Supreme Court did not stray from the Confrontation Clause’s 
focus on reliability in Crawford v. Washington.
55
 However, the Court 
began to treat the Clause as a procedural, rather than substantive, 
guarantee:  
 
 
question did not require any individualized finding that the witnesses testifying required special 
protection. Id. at 1021. Recognizing that the right to face-to-face confrontation at trial could give way 
to other important interests, the Court found that the prosecution did not demonstrate any public policy 
interests at stake and implied that the Iowa statute should require such a showing. Id. 
 51. Craig, 497 U.S. at 857. 
 52. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468–69 (2012) (prohibiting, under the Eighth 
Amendment, a juvenile sentence of life without the possibility of parole without consideration of 
mitigating factors such as the juvenile’s youth and immaturity); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 
2394, 2403–06 (2011) (finding a child’s age relevant to Miranda determinations); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010) (holding that Eighth Amendment precludes a sentence of life without 
parole for minors who commit nonhomicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 
(2005) (describing the developmental differences between juveniles and adults and, consequently, 
holding that imposition of the death penalty on all minors is cruel and unusual under the Eighth 
Amendment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834–35 (1988) (recognizing that “adolescents as 
a class are less mature and responsible than adults” in deciding that the death penalty was cruel and 
unusual where the defendant committed the underlying crime at 15 years of age); Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–17 (1982) (holding that a state court must consider mitigating evidence 
regarding a child’s age and upbringing before sentencing a 16 year old to death). 
 53. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849. 
 54. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (drawing a distinction between cases like Coy 
and Craig, which concerned the constitutionality of in-court procedures once a witness is testifying, 
and what the Constitution requires before the introduction of out-of-court statements). 
 55. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of 
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. 
It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about 
the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be 
little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined.
56
  
Purporting to properly align Confrontation Clause analysis with its 
history,
57
 the Crawford decision essentially limited the breadth of the 
Clause’s application but strengthened the depth of its requirements. While 
Roberts applied to all out-of-court statements, Crawford confined 
application of the Confrontation Clause to a new category of statements 
called testimonial hearsay.
58
 At the same time, the Court criticized Roberts 
for leaving the right of confrontation to a judicial determination of 
reliability.
59
 Finding reliability to be overly indeterminate,
60
 Crawford 
held that the admission of testimonial hearsay, without the presence and 
testimony of the witness at trial, is absolutely barred by the Confrontation 
Clause unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.
61
 In effect, for an out-of-court 
statement to be used as evidence, the defendant must be afforded some 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness who made the statement. 
Crawford essentially changed the question asked for admitting hearsay 
in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Rather than weigh the 
substantive reliability of hearsay in each case, courts determine whether 
hearsay is testimonial and, if so, categorically require a particular 
procedure—in-court testimony and confrontation. Grounding this category 
of hearsay in history, the Crawford majority found that the Confrontation 
Clause was concerned primarily with statements resembling testimony.
62
 
 
 
 56. Id. at 61 (citations omitted). 
 57. Id. at 60. This Section has already explained, however, that the Crawford standard is not 
above historical reproach. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
 58. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. Crawford itself did not answer whether the Confrontation 
Clause was concerned solely with testimonial hearsay. Id. at 53. Subsequent decisions confirmed that 
the Clause does not implicate nontestimonial hearsay. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 
840 (2006). 
 59. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54. 
 60. The Court found troubling that the Roberts definition of reliability depended so much on the 
subjectivity of judges and cited a string of similar cases resulting in disparate outcomes. Id. at 52–53.  
 61. Id. at 54.  
 62. The majority focused on the phrase “witnesses against” to determine that the Confrontation 
Clause referred to any out-of-court statement that was the functional equivalent of in-court testimony. 
Id. at 42–43, 50–53; see also supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
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Though the Court suggested that the purpose and circumstances of 
statements were decisive, Crawford declined to absolutely define 
testimonial hearsay.
63
 Subsequent decisions have struggled with that very 
task.
64
 Nonetheless, the impact of Crawford has been significant—
particularly for child witnesses—as will be explored in the following 
sections.
65
 Regardless of the standard, what must be emphasized is that the 
underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause has historically been, and 
continues to be, ensuring the reliability of evidence. 
III. CONFRONTING CHILD WITNESSES  
Where the previous Part established that the purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of evidence at criminal 
trials, this Part draws from social and psychological research to argue this 
purpose is undercut when it comes to children. More specifically, the 
suggestibility of young children means subjecting child witnesses to cross-
examination can actually produce less accurate testimony. This Part begins 
as the previous did: with a brief historical account. The history of child 
witnesses demonstrates that children were not necessarily contemplated 
when the Confrontation Clause was adopted. At the very least, cultural 
views of children have been evolving for two hundred years—a fact which 
Confrontation Clause analysis should consider. The rest of this Part is 
dedicated to contemporary research on children and why subjecting 
children to cross-examination has the potential to reduce the reliability and 
accuracy of their testimony. 
A. History of Children as Witnesses 
Rules surrounding the admissibility of child testimony in criminal 
prosecutions were changing when the Sixth Amendment was adopted in 
1791. There are numerous examples from English common-law decisions 
in the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century of young 
children testifying without question, or even of parents testifying on their 
 
 
 63. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. The Court laid out three potential definitions: (1) ex parte in-
court testimony, (2) extrajudicial statements contained in formalized affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions, and (3) pretrial statements made “under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 64. See infra Part IV.A. 
 65. See infra Part IV. 
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child’s behalf—what now would be known as hearsay.66 In fact, the age of 
a witness was rarely mentioned during this period.
67
 American courts 
followed the example of their English brethren and generally accepted 
child testimony, even without confrontation. By the late eighteenth 
century, however, standard practice was more in flux. Contemporary 
evidence law focused primarily on the swearing of an oath—something 
scholars and judges began doubting was possible for young children.
68
 
Judges started to conduct pretrial screenings of children for competence 
and excluded witnesses they deemed unable to be sworn.
69
 Nonetheless, 
adults were often allowed to testify as to what incompetent children said, 
on the theory that their statements represented the best evidence 
available.
70
 Even then, legal treatises and court decisions treated child 
testimony as lesser than that of adults; they believed that testimony from 
children, without corroboration, should not support convictions for more 
serious felonies.
71
 A presumption of incompetence for child witnesses was 
developing and, by the early nineteenth century, there existed a categorical 
rule that children must reach a certain age before testifying.
72
  
The historical use of child witnesses in the United States—as 
demonstrated by changing practices at the turn of the nineteenth century—
has developed and adapted alongside changing norms regarding children 
in general. After the Constitution was adopted, a belief that children 
should be protected was growing, and evidentiary rules shielding children 
from testifying became increasingly common.
73
 This is not to say that 
 
 
 66. HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
155–56 (2005). 
 67. Id. at 156 (“While ages are infrequently specified in the court records, their scarcity is itself a 
clue to their relative unimportance.”). It should be noted that child abuse prosecutions, in which it was 
common for children to testify, were themselves a rarity in the Eighteenth Century. See Myrna S. 
Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The Intersection of 
Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1010 (2007). 
 68. BREWER, supra note 66, at 157–58; Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The History of 
Children’s Hearsay: From Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. 1029, 1030–31 (2007). 
 69. BREWER, supra note 66, at 157–58. 
 70. Lyon & LaMagna, supra note 68, at 1030–31; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the 
Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them”, 82 IND. L.J. 
917, 932 (2007); Deborah Paruch, Silencing the Victims in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The 
Confrontation Clause and Children’s Hearsay Statements Before and After Michigan v. Bryant, 28 
TOURO L. REV. 85, 94 (2012). 
 71. BREWER, supra note 66, at 153–54, 163; Lyon & LaMagna, supra note 68, at 1030–31; 
Mosteller, supra note 70, at 930. 
 72. BREWER, supra note 66, at 159–60 (some courts required children to be as old as fourteen 
before they could be sworn as witnesses). 
 73. See generally David S. Tanenhaus & William Bush, Toward a History of Children as 
Witnesses, 82 IND. L.J. 1059 (2007). 
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children in eighteenth-century common law never testified or that their 
unsworn statements were never admitted. Indeed, they did, and they were. 
Ultimately, though, the law has treated children’s hearsay statements as 
different than those of adults for centuries. To the extent Crawford 
attempts to ground the Confrontation Clause in history, the distinction 
between adult and child witnesses should be relevant to the right of 
confrontation.  
Jumping ahead to the late twentieth century, two modern trends in child 
testimony are important to mention. First, a slew of protective statutes 
were put in place during the 1980s in response to a series of widely 
publicized sexual abuse scandals at daycare centers around the country.
74
 
These measures were aimed at shielding child abuse victims from the 
trauma of criminal investigations
75
 and trials,
76
 while ensuring their 
statements could be used to convict child abusers. For a number of 
reasons, child testimony in criminal trials is most common in cases where 
children themselves are the victims.
77
 Today, it is estimated that 
 
 
 74. For an account of these scandals, see LUCY S. MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE 
VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 8–13 (1994). 
 75. A common concern emerged following these infamous child sexual abuse cases that the very 
investigation into those crimes was further traumatizing children. To ease the investigative process for 
children, many states consolidated criminal investigation and treatment of child abuse victims into 
single child abuse prevention centers, commonly known as Child Advocacy Centers (CACs). These 
centers house medical personnel, child protective services, and law enforcement all in one location. 
Trained specialists interview children about their abuse once in a child-friendly environment, rather 
than subject victims to multiple interviews. See Nancy Chandler, Children’s Advocacy Centers: 
Making a Difference One Child at a Time, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 315, 328–36 (2006). In this 
way, states intended CACs to reduce the trauma of multiple retellings of abuse and minimize the risk 
of fabrication or coaching through successive interviews. See Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny 
Happened on the Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 
927 (1993). For a more detailed history of CACs, see Chandler, supra, at 316–21. 
 76. State legislatures enacted child hearsay statutes, which permitted the admission of child 
statements made to forensic interviewers through the testimony of the interviewer. See MCGOUGH, 
supra note 74, at 14. Prosecutors would also rely on Ohio v. Roberts to admit child hearsay through 
traditional hearsay exceptions without confrontation. See Matthew W. Staab, Note, Child’s Play: 
Avoiding the Pitfalls of Crawford v. Washington in Child Abuse Prosecutions, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 
501, 522–23 (2005). Finally, courts employed specialized, informal procedures for child witnesses 
who actually did testify. See MCGOUGH, supra note 74, at 10–11. 
 77. For instance, take child sexual abuse cases. In these cases, children are often the only 
witnesses to the crime. See Jonathan Scher, Note, Out-of-Court Statements by Victims of Child Sexual 
Abuse to Multidisciplinary Teams: A Confrontation Clause Analysis, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 167, 170 
(2009). Child abuse is a crime that tends to occur in secret; abusers target children when they are alone 
and the abuse happens in private settings. See Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children 
Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 375 
(2005). Alternative evidence of the crime, either eyewitnesses or physical evidence, is rare. See 
Kimberly Y. Chin, Note, “Minute and Separate”: Considering the Admissibility of Videotaped 
Forensic Interviews in Child Sex Abuse Cases after Crawford and Davis, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
67, 84 (2010). For this reason, convictions for child sexual abuse are often based primarily on the 
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approximately 100,000 children testify each year in the United States
78—a 
fact that further highlights the importance of child testimony.
79
 Second, as 
these new child-friendly courtroom procedures developed, researchers 
took a heightened interest in the psychology of children as witnesses, and 
a still-growing body of literature attempted to define the strengths and 
weaknesses of child testimony. The next few sections take up this 
research.  
B. Child Memory 
Memory is not perfect. This is true of children, and it is true of adults. 
It is easiest to conceptualize memory as occurring in three stages: 
experiencing the actual event, storing or encoding the event into memory, 
and retrieving that memory of the event at a later time—i.e., 
remembering.
80
 A problem at any one of these stages can affect what is 
remembered, how it is remembered, and how accurately it can be 
recalled.
81
 For instance, individual characteristics, including age, can 
affect how an event is remembered.
82
 The types of questions asked of 
witnesses and the behavior of interviewers can affect recall of the event as 
well.
83
 These variables reinforce an important fact: memories are not 
 
 
testimony of the victim. These features are not true for most other types of crime, making child 
witnesses particularly common in abuse cases.  
 78. Angela D. Evans, Kang Lee & Thomas D. Lyon, Complex Questions Asked by Defense 
Lawyers but Not Prosecutors Predicts Convictions in Child Abuse Trials, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
258, 258 (2009). 
 79. Child sexual abuse is already an underreported crime. See Catherine Dixon, Best Practices in 
the Response to Child Abuse, 25 MISS. C. L. REV. 73, 74 (2005) (quoting survey data of adults who 
were abused as children but never reported it). When abuse is reported, child victims may be unable or 
unwilling to testify because they have a preexisting relationship with their abuser, see Thomas D. Lyon 
& Julia A. Dente, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1181, 1203 (2012), because they are afraid of testifying, see infra note 127, or because they are afraid 
of their abusers, see infra note 128. For these reasons, the testimony of children is particularly 
important for the prosecution of child abuse. 
 80. See Lynne Baker-Ward & Peter A. Ornstein, Cognitive Underpinnings of Children’s 
Testimony, in CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY: A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND FORENSIC 
PRACTICE 21, 23–27 (Helen L. Westcott et al. eds., 2002); Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., General Review 
of the Psychology of Witness Testimony, in WITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL, INVESTIGATIVE, 
AND EVIDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 7, 7–8 (Anthony Heaton-Armstrong et al. eds., 2006). 
 81. See Loftus et al., supra note 80, at 8–17 (describing various factors which can affect each of 
the three stages of memory). 
 82. Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PYSCHOL. 277, 
280–84 (2003). 
 83. See Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application of 
Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PYSCHOL. 581, 582 (2000) (citing research which demonstrates that 
misleading questions can cause memories of an event to change or be replaced with new memories); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/9
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permanent. Memories can change or fade away over time and can be 
shaped by perceptions or expectations about the event rather than an actual 
recollection of the event.
84
  
While scholars disagree as to what degree a child can be a competent 
witness,
85
 the weight of psychological research suggests that, at a 
minimum, children are less suited to testifying in court than adults.
86
 
Unsurprisingly, cognitive ability, including the ability to remember and 
relate events, develops over time. This is not to say that all child testimony 
is unreliable;
87
 there is variability among and within age groups.
88
 In 
general, though, adversarial criminal trials are developmentally 
inappropriate for children—particularly young children.89 
Kids sometimes remember things differently or not at all. Salient 
events—that is, what is stored into memory—often differ for children 
from what adults find relevant and memorable.
90
 And naturally so; 
children, quite simply, are less experienced and understand less about the 
world than adults. Only over time do children learn what details are 
 
 
cf. Wells & Olson, supra note 82, at 286–89 (describing the effects of suggestive police conduct on the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification of suspects in police lineups).  
 84. Baker-Ward & Ornstein, supra note 80, at 25–26. 
 85. See Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific 
Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33, 34–39 (2000) (describing the disagreement 
in the field of psychology between the mainstream view of child witnesses as highly suggestible and 
the modern revisionist challenge to this traditional view); John E.B. Myers, Adjudication of Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases, FUTURE CHILD., Summer/Fall 1994, at 84, 86 (identifying the differences 
between studies conducted by adherents to the mainstream view and those performed by modern 
critics). 
 86.  See generally id. at 39–71 (providing a historical overview of psychological research on child 
witnesses arguing that modern studies do not disprove the fact that children are more suggestible than 
adults).  
 87. See Mosteller, supra note 70, at 921 (acknowledging that some children can testify to the 
same degree that adults can); see also Rachel Zajac, Sarah O’Neill, & Harlene Hayne, Disorder in the 
Courtroom? Child Witnesses Under Cross-Examination, 32 DEV. REV. 181, 189–92 (2012) (citing 
reasons why studies of children’s responses to cross-examination-style questioning could have limited 
application to real-world situations). 
 88. Baker-Ward & Ornstein, supra note 80, at 23–27; Loftus et al., supra note 80, at 7–8. 
 89. Psychological research on child witnesses often distinguishes young children, typically from 
five to six years old and younger, from children in general, ranging from about six-years-old into 
adolescence. Numerous measures of cognitive functioning relevant to testifying at a criminal trial are 
of particular difficulty for young children. See generally John E.B. Myers et al., Psychological 
Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom 
Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3 (1996) (noting that, on a number of variables, young children are more 
suggestible and their memory less developed than older children). 
 90. See NANCY WALKER PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD WITNESS: LEGAL 
ISSUES AND DILEMMAS 108 (1991) (“[C]hildren sometimes fail to note some peripheral elements 
because such elements may lack significance in their experience. At the same time, other extraneous 
elements may be given exaggerated importance because of their transitory relevance to the child.”); 
Myers et al., supra note 89, at 9. 
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important to remember.
91
 Significantly, what children do remember tends 
to be less forensically relevant than adult memories.
92
 Questioning, 
particularly during cross-examination, often requires memory of highly 
specific and detailed information, which children are simply less likely to 
notice or remember.
93
 Finally, research shows that it is much harder for 
children to retrieve salient memories compared to adults.
94
 Children 
generally require much more prompting and clues about the relevant event 
to recall a memory, making the type of question asked much more 
important for accurate child testimony.
95
  
This last fact presents a sort of conundrum for questioning child 
witnesses. Young children experience difficulty responding to open-ended, 
free-recall questions.
96
 Such questions require a witness to rely only on his 
or her own memory to answer, often a difficult task for young children. 
Answers given by young children, even if accurate, are often incomplete.
97
 
On the other hand, leading questions—common on cross-examination—
can assist children’s memories substantially but risk confusing or 
influencing answers.
98
 Attorneys, then, may face a choice between 
accurate or complete testimony. 
C. Suggestibility of Children 
Perhaps the greatest concern regarding child witnesses is their 
suggestibility. In general, children are more susceptible to being 
 
 
 91. See Baker-Ward & Ornstein, supra note 80, at 29 (noting that knowledge increases with age 
and a greater knowledge base increases storage and recall of memories); Lynn McLain, “Sweet 
Childish Days”: Using Developmental Psychology Research in Evaluating the Admissibility of Out-of-
Court Statements by Young Children, 64 ME. L. REV. 77, 113 (2011) (“Adult and children’s 
perceptions of an event may differ in one sense, because of their different understandings of the 
context of the event.”). 
 92. See Karen J. Saywitz, Development Underpinnings of Children’s Testimony, in CHILDREN’S 
TESTIMONY, supra note 80, at 8 (explaining that children are less likely to remember identifying 
information, such as height or hair color, than adults). 
 93. See Zajac, O’Neill & Hayne, supra note 87, at 185 (suggesting that questions concerning 
“time, frequency, duration, directions, and measurement” are difficult for children given their 
cognitive development). 
 94. PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 90, at 111–12 (noting that free recall, requiring a person 
to remember a previously observed event without any prompts, is a more complex form of retrieval 
and one whose use greatly varies with age); Saywitz, supra note 92, at 8 (citing research findings that 
young children demonstrate simplistic and ineffective retrieval strategies compared to older children 
and adults). 
 95. Loftus et al., supra note 80, at 19; Saywitz, supra note 92, at 8. 
 96. Myers et al., supra note 89, at 11.  
 97. Id. at 12. 
 98. Id. at 13; see also infra Part III.C. 
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influenced by leading questioning,
99
 a weakness stemming from various 
facets of children’s developmental immaturity. First, children are generally 
deferential to adults. As stated, children are naturally less experienced and 
learn about the world by looking to adults for answers.
100
 Second, since 
children require more prompting to fully recall memories, they often rely 
on cues from adults to properly remember events.
101
 Finally, children often 
struggle to identify the source of their beliefs,
102
 which causes difficulty 
distinguishing between real, perceived memories of an event and 
memories generated from false information.
103
 Leading questions thus risk 
confusing children or inducing them to give a suggested answer.  
Studies have shown that the types of questions asked on cross-
examination often prompt children to give incorrect and inconsistent 
answers.
104
 For example, in one study, five- to six-year-old children 
participated in a common event (a trip to the local police station).
105
 Six 
weeks later, each child was interviewed about the event using open-ended 
questions, similar to direct examination.
106
 Eight months after that, each 
child took part in a cross-examination-style interview about the same 
event.
107
 Eighty-five percent of children, in response to leading questions 
during this second interview, deviated from their previous answers.
108
 
Perhaps more striking, even children who were not exposed to any false 
information in between the two interviews still later changed some of their 
answers when prompted.
109
 The implication is that leading questions can 
 
 
 99. See generally Michael R. Keenan, Note, Child Witnesses: Implications of Contemporary 
Suggestibility Research in a Changing Legal Landscape, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 99, 102–09 
(2007). However, the suggestibility of children should not be exaggerated. Adults can certainly be 
subject to influence and leading as well. McLain, supra note 91, at 114. In fact, research suggests that 
by age ten or eleven, children are no more suggestible than adults. Myers et al., supra note 89, at 27–
28. Even young children vary in their ability to resist suggestion. Keenan, supra, at 102–03. 
 100. See Saywitz, supra note 92, at 9. 
 101. See id. at 10. 
 102. See D. Stephen Lindsay, Children’s Source Monitoring, in CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY, supra 
note 80, at 86–94. 
 103. See Saywitz, supra note 92, at 11. 
 104. See Zajac, O’Neill & Hayne, supra note 87, at 185–88 (providing an overview of studies on 
child suggestibility); Rachel Zajac, Emma Jury & Sarah O’Neill, The Role of Psychosocial Factors in 
Young Children’s Responses to Cross-Examination Style Questioning, 23 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PYSCHOL. 918 (2009) (finding that children with low self-esteem or self-confidence are more likely to 
change their answers during cross-examination). 
 105.  Rachel Zajac & Harlene Hayne, I Don’t Think That’s What Really Happened: The Effect of 
Cross-Examination on the Accuracy of Children’s Reports, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 187, 188 
(2003). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 189. 
 108. Id. at 190. 
 109. Id. at 190–91. 
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confuse and manipulate children, even those originally confident in their 
memories.
110
  
D. Legal Terminology and Miscommunication 
The criminal justice system was designed “by adults, for adults.”111 The 
legal process presents a novel and confusing setting for children. Legal 
terms common in courtrooms are typically unfamiliar to young children.
112
 
One study demonstrated this fact by testing kindergarteners, third graders, 
and sixth graders on legal terminology.
113
 Children were instructed to 
simply say everything they knew about a legal term, and answers were 
scored on level of correctness.
114
 While the older age group scored better 
than the younger ones, all age groups generally misunderstood some 
terms.
115
 Children often mistook or associated legal terms with similar-
sounding words.
116
 Besides using legal jargon, attorneys are notorious for 
asking difficult and confusing questions. Young children tend to respond 
more accurately to simple, short sentence structures.
117
 Questions on cross-
examination, in contrast, tend to involve complex language and complex 
sentence structure.
118
 As a result, children are often ill-equipped to 
undergo cross-examination; simply by asking questions beyond a child’s 
understanding, defense attorneys can discredit and lead child witnesses.  
To complicate matters, children struggle to communicate their 
confusion while testifying. Not only do children, particularly young 
children, often fail to comprehend a question, children typically fail to 
communicate this misunderstanding and rarely ask for clarification.
119
 In 
everyday life, children learn to structure their language and responses by 
 
 
 110. The same authors conducted a follow-up study with nine- and ten-year-old children. Rachel 
Zajac & Harlene Hayne, The Negative Effect of Cross-Examination Style Questioning on Children’s 
Accuracy: Older Children Are Not Immune, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PYSCHOL. 3 (2006). Though older 
children were better at correcting their mistakes and resisting leading questions, a number of children 
were still induced to change their originally correct answers on cross-examination. Id. at 12. 
 111. Zajac, O’Neill & Hayne, supra note 87, at 182. 
 112. Saywitz, supra note 92, at 4.  
 113. Karen Saywitz, Carole Jaenicke & Lorinda Camparo, Children’s Knowledge of Legal 
Terminology, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 523, 525 (1990). 
 114. Id. at 525–26. 
 115. Id. at 527. 
 116. Id. at 532–33. For instance, words like “hearing” and “parties” have common nonlegal 
meanings as well. Id. at 532. Terms unfamiliar to children could be associated with similar words—
e.g., “testify” is similar to “test,” a concept more familiar to children. Id. at 533. 
 117. Saywitz, supra note 92, at 4–5. 
 118. See Zajac, O’Neill & Hayne, supra note 87, at 184. 
 119. Saywitz, supra note 92, at 5 (noting that “children rarely ask for clarification or indicate 
misunderstanding” in response to a question that confuses them). 
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the correction of supportive adults; this safety net is absent during trial 
testimony.
120
 On their own, many children are unable to monitor how well 
they understand a question.
121
 A child may not know an answer, but, in the 
context of an interview, that child still feels the social pressure to 
respond.
122
 Moreover, children may not understand the significance of 
incorrect answers or answers to questions they do not understand.
123
 
Studies show that children will attempt to answer nonsensical or 
incomprehensible questions, even when children recognize the question 
does not make sense.
124
  
E. Trauma of Testifying 
An ancillary yet important issue concerning the reliability of child 
testimony is the potential for trauma. Child witnesses commonly report 
being afraid of testifying and experiencing distress while being questioned 
on cross-examination.
125
 Indeed, law reporters are replete with cases where 
a child was unavailable for fear of testifying in open court and in the 
presence of the accused.
126
 A number of factors contribute to this trauma: 
repeating one’s story of abuse and reliving the crime, unfamiliarity with 
the legal process, and being subject to direct and cross-examination in 
general.
127
 Particularly frightening for child witnesses is confronting the 
defendant while testifying.
128
 Research shows that trauma and stress 
 
 
 120. See Amanda Waterman et al., How and Why Do Children Respond to Nonsensical 
Questions?, in CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY, supra note 80, at 147. 
 121. Myers et al., supra note 89, at 55. 
 122. See id. at 55–56. 
 123.  See id. 
 124. See Zajac, O’Neill & Hayne, supra note 87, at 184–85 (suggesting that children are 
particularly likely to give answers to questions they do not understand during cross-examination, 
where questions often require only a simply yes-or-no response). 
 125. See Peter Dunn & Eric Shepard, Oral Testimony from the Witness’s Perspective: 
Psychological and Forensic Considerations, in WITNESS TESTIMONY, supra note 80, at 369 (citing 
research which finds that a majority of young witnesses reported feeling stressed, frightened, and less 
confident during testimony); see also Zajac, O’Neill & Hayne, supra note 87, at 182. 
 126. See, e.g., Styron v. State, 34 So. 3d 724 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009); People v. Burns, 832 
N.W.2d 738 (Mich. 2013); In re N.C., 74 A.3d 271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); State v. Ladner, 644 S.E.2d 
684 (S.C. 2007). 
 127. See Tanya Asim Cooper, Sacrificing the Child to Convict the Defendant: Secondary 
Traumatization of Child Witnesses by Prosecutors, Their Inherent Conflict of Interest, and the Need 
for Child Witness Counsel, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 239, 251 (2011); Saywitz, supra 
note 92, at 12–13 (describing the sources of fear and embarrassment associated with children who 
testify in court and the lack of useful strategies most children have to cope with that stress). 
 128. Dorothy F. Marsil et al., Child Witness Policy: Law Interfacing with Social Science, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2002, at 209, 214. 
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generally decrease one’s ability to recall a memory accurately.129 Studies 
of child witnesses in particular have demonstrated that the stress of facing 
the defendant reduces the likelihood of testifying truthfully and 
accurately.
130
  
IV. CHILD WITNESSES POST-CRAWFORD  
Given the documented risks of children testifying, whether Crawford 
requires cross-examination of child witnesses in open court is of great 
importance. By most accounts, Crawford’s redefinition of the 
Confrontation Clause decreased the use of child witnesses in U.S. criminal 
trials.
131
 Under Roberts, hearsay statements of child witnesses were 
regularly found admissible upon a judicial determination that the statement 
was reliable,
132
 when statements fell within a traditional hearsay 
exception,
133
 or under statutory hearsay exceptions for children.
134
 Of 
additional note, many state courts also afforded special procedures for 
children to testify without facing the defendant or jury.
135
 In Crawford, the 
Court criticized these judicial determinations of reliability and prohibited 
the admission of testimonial hearsay without a prior opportunity for 
confrontation. Despite efforts by scholars to situate child witness 
statements into the nontestimonial category, this section shows that the 
vast majority of child hearsay is testimonial. At the very least, children 
receive no special treatment due to their age or immaturity under 
Crawford’s categorical rule. As a result, out-of-court child statements 
 
 
 129. See Loftus et al., supra note 80, at 18. 
 130. See Marsil et al., supra note 128, at 214–15; Holly K. Orcutt et al., Detecting Deception in 
Children’s Testimony: Factfinders’ Abilities to Reach the Truth in Open Court and Closed-Circuit 
Trials, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 339–42 (2001). 
 131. See Lyon & Dente, supra note 79, at 1189 (arguing that Crawford has likely deterred 
prosecution of child abuse cases). 
 132. See, e.g., State v. Merriam, 835 A.2d 895 (Conn. 2003) (finding the circumstances 
surrounding the child’s allegations of abuse were sufficiently reliable under Roberts); State v. Dever, 
596 N.E.2d 436 (Ohio 1992) (holding that a child’s statements to doctor were sufficiently reliable to 
be admitted without testimony from the child). 
 133. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 1991) (medical diagnosis or treatment 
exception); State v. Plant, 461 N.W.2d 253 (Neb. 1990) (excited utterance exception). 
 134. See, e.g., Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1990) (child victim hearsay statute); Perez 
v. State, 536 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1988) (child hearsay statute); State v. Kuone, 757 P.2d 289 (Kan. 1988) 
(child victim hearsay statute); State v. Twist, 528 A.2d 1250 (Me. 1987) (state hearsay exception for 
children describing sexual abuse).  
 135. See, e.g., People v. Lofton, 740 N.E.2d 782 (Ill. 2000) (use of podiums that prevented 
witness and defendant from seeing each other during the child’s testimony). But see Price v. 
Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 885 (Ky. 2000) (finding the exclusion of the defendant from the 
courtroom during the child accuser’s testimony violated the right of confrontation). 
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found reliable under the Roberts standard have now become barred as 
testimonial under Crawford.
136
  
A. Child Witness Statements to Law Enforcement Are Testimonial 
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of testimonial hearsay in two 
jointly decided opinions: Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.
137
 
Both cases concerned the admission of out-of-court statements made by 
alleged victims of domestic abuse.
138
 According to Davis, whether 
statements are testimonial or nontestimonial depends on the objective 
primary purpose of the interview.
139
 When the primary purpose of law 
enforcement interrogation is “to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency,” then statements in response to this questioning are 
nontestimonial.
140
 In contrast, when the primary purpose of police 
questioning is “to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later prosecution,” statements in response would be testimonial.141 Where 
 
 
 136. See Lyon & Dente, supra note 79, at 1188–89 (listing cases where child abuse convictions 
based on the testimony of the victim were reversed after the Supreme Court decided Crawford); Staab, 
supra note 76, at 502–03 (arguing that Crawford will limit the use of child witnesses because children, 
due to fear of testifying in court or parental pressures, are often unavailable to testify); Erin Thompson, 
Comment, Child Sex Abuse Victims: How Will Their Stories Be Told After Crawford v. Washington?, 
27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 279, 286–89 (2005) (listing cases which were overturned after Crawford due to 
the admission of hearsay statements of a an unavailable child witness). 
 137. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 138. In Davis, the prosecution sought admission of a 911-call recording in which the victim 
described that she had just been assaulted by the defendant, her former boyfriend. Id. at 817–18. The 
defendant was still in the house at the beginning of this call and, by the end, was driving away as the 
victim was on the phone. Id. at 818. In Hammon, police responded to a reported domestic disturbance 
at the defendant’s house. Id. at 819. Upon arrival, the police learned from the defendant’s wife that 
there had been an altercation between the two. Id. The police separated the wife from the defendant, 
asked her some questions, and eventually asked her to fill out a battery affidavit. Id. at 819–20. The 
prosecutors tried to use this affidavit at trial against the defendant. Id. at 820. 
 139. Id. at 822. 
 140. Id. In Davis, the Court found that the following circumstances would lead an objectively 
reasonable person to believe that the 911 operator’s interview was in response to an emergency rather 
than for the purpose of gathering evidence to use at a later trial: the victim was speaking about events 
as they were actually happening; the victim’s purpose in calling 911 seemed to be to seek help; the 
questions asked and answered during the 911 call were for the purpose of resolving the ongoing 
emergency; and the victim’s answers were frantic and the interview informal. Id. at 827. The Court 
concluded that these circumstances objectively indicated that the primary purpose of the 911 call was 
to respond to an ongoing emergency. Id. at 828. The Court was quick to point out, however, that 
interviews which began as emergency response questions could evolve into an investigatory interview 
which would then become testimonial. Id. at 828–29. 
 141. Id. at 822. The Court compared the affidavit in Hammon to the testimonial statements in 
Crawford. Cite. The victim in Hammon did not indicate an emergency was ongoing, the officers asked 
the victim about past events rather than what was happening currently, and the officers asked the 
victim to fill out an affidavit—which was comparable to a formal interrogation. Id. at 830. Such 
statements were testimonial and could not act as a substitute for live testimony. Id. 
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a declarant is answering questions in response to an ongoing emergency, 
he or she is not acting as a witness or testifying; therefore, those 
statements would not serve as a weaker substitute for live testimony.
142
 
The Supreme Court left unclear in Davis whether the declarant’s or the 
interviewer’s perspective was relevant to this primary purpose test. In 
Michigan v. Bryant,
143
 the most recent case of concern to child witnesses, 
the Court held that both the purpose of the witness and the purpose of 
interrogator are relevant.
144
 The Court also reaffirmed the principle that the 
subjective purpose of either party is irrelevant; it is only what an 
objectively reasonable participant would view as the purpose of the 
statement or questioning.
145
 
Under Davis and Bryant, the statements of children are treated as 
identical to those of adults. These cases dictate that the primary purpose of 
a statement should be determined from the perspective of an objectively 
reasonable person.
146
 While some scholars have used these terms as 
justification for treating child witnesses differently,
147
 lower courts have 
generally been reluctant to do so.
148
 Even if a child would not anticipate 
his or her statements being used for litigation purposes, an objectively 
reasonable person in the child’s circumstances very well might.  
 
 
 142. Id. at 828. 
 143. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 144. Id. at 1161. But see id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the relevant perspective, 
under Crawford and Davis, is only that of the declarant). Though Bryant declared both perspectives 
relevant, the decision itself focused primarily on that of the police officer asking the shooting victim 
questions. Id. at 1162. 
 145. Id. at 1156 (“The circumstances in which an encounter occurs—e.g., at or near the scene of 
the crime versus at a police station, during an ongoing emergency or afterwards—are clearly matters 
of objective fact. The statements and actions of the parties must also be objectively evaluated. That is, 
the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in a particular 
encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the 
individuals’ statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred.”). 
 146.  See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 147. See, e.g., Christopher Cannon Funk, Note, The Reasonable Child Declarant After Davis v. 
Washington, 61 STAN. L. REV. 923, 947–59 (2009) (arguing that courts should consider a reasonable 
person in light of the child victim’s age, intelligence, and experience). 
 148. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776 (Kan. 2007). In Henderson, the State sought to 
admit a videotaped interview between an alleged victim of child abuse and police officers. Id. at 781. 
In holding that the interview was testimonial, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that the victim 
did not fully understand the implications of her statements, but ruled that “a young victim’s awareness, 
or lack thereof, that her statement would be used to prosecute” was relevant, but not dispositive, under 
the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 785. While the victim was immature, the police officers 
questioning her were not. The court found dispositive that police had a suspect in mind when 
questioning the victim, that they only asked questions implicating the defendant, the formal 
investigative style of the interview, and the involvement of police throughout the process. Id. at 787–
90. 
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In addition, since Bryant held that the perspective of the questioner was 
relevant to the primary purpose test as well,
149
 child statements prompted 
by police questioning are likely testimonial in nature. Barring some 
ongoing emergency,
150
 the Supreme Court has made clear that police-
initiated statements were a prime concern of the Confrontation Clause.
151
 
Despite states’ efforts to shield child witnesses from testifying,152 cases in 
which children themselves are victimized nonetheless prove problematic 
when law enforcement is in any way involved in questioning.
153
 As a 
result, whether a child witness statement is testimonial often hinges on to 
whom and under what circumstances the statement was made.
154
 
B. Davis and Bryant Emergency Doctrine 
The emergency doctrine articulated in Davis likewise does not support 
treating child witness statements as nontestimonial. As already explained, 
the Supreme Court in Davis held that statements made in response to 
police questioning were nonetheless nontestimonial where police were 
 
 
 149. See supra note 144. 
 150. See infra Part IV.B. 
 151. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52–53 (2004) (“Statements taken by police 
officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard. . . . 
[I]nterrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class [of testimonial hearsay].”). 
 152. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 153. See, e.g., State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2007) (holding that a child victim’s 
statements to a counselor at a child protection center were testimonial given the involvement of law 
enforcement); State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2008) (finding that a forensic interviewer’s 
cooperation with law enforcement turned an interview of the alleged child victim into testimonial 
hearsay) State v. Arnold, 933 N.E.2d 775 (Ohio 2010) (finding that statements of a child victim to an 
interviewer at a CAC were for investigative purposes and therefore testimonial). The irony that CACs, 
designed in part to alleviate concerns about the reliability of child abuse allegations, now cause the 
inadmissibility of those very statements has not been lost on scholars. See, e.g., Anna Richey-Allen, 
Note, Presuming Innocence: Expanding the Confrontation Clause Analysis to Protect Children and 
Defendants in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1090 (2009) (discussing the 
problems of applying the primary purpose test to CACs due to the multiple purposes of forensic 
interviews).  
 154. See Seely v. State, 282 S.W.3d 778 (Ark. 2008) (holding that the hearsay statements 
concerning abuse that a daughter made to her mother and then to a social worker were not testimonial); 
State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 2007) (holding that a child victim’s statements to a nurse 
were nontestimonial); State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863 (Wash. 2011) (holding that a child victim’s out-
of-court statements to family members were not testimonial); cf. State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 
2005) (holding that statements made to a social worker employed by Child Protective Services were 
testimonial because the interview was conducted for the purpose of developing testimony against the 
defendant); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. 2006) (finding that statements made to sex abuse 
counselors, who were government agents, were testimonial). See also Robert P. Mosteller, 
Confrontation in Children’s Cases: The Dimensions of Limited Coverage, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 393, 402–
16 (2012) (discussing how, after Crawford, whether the statement of a child victim is testimonial 
depends on if the statement was made to parents, doctors, social workers, or police). 
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merely responding to an ongoing emergency.
155
 The Bryant decision 
expanded upon this doctrine.
156
 In that case, the Court described 
emergencies as context-dependent.
157
 For purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause, an emergency could extend beyond the limited scenario in Davis 
in which a victim was presently in danger at the time of the police 
questioning. What constitutes an emergency requires an assessment of the 
potential ongoing threat to the police and public in general.
158
 The 
formality of the interview and the nature of the questions asked of the 
witness are still relevant to determining testimonial statements.
159
  
The concept of an ongoing emergency does not transfer cleanly to 
crimes typically perpetrated against children. Take child abuse, for 
example.
160
 Bryant itself seems to reject the extension of this doctrine to 
police interviews with alleged child abuse victims.
161
 Regardless, the 
continuing threat to police and general public, dispositive in Bryant, are 
not generally present in child abuse cases. Certainly the public danger of 
child abuse does not compare to that of an active gunman. Moreover, 
when interviewed by police, the victim is not in any apparent danger or 
 
 
 155. See supra notes 140, 142. 
 156. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011). In Bryant, police responded to a reported 
shooting at a gas station to find a gunshot victim lying on the ground next to his car and appearing to 
be in great pain. Id. at 1150. Before ambulances took the victim to the hospital, police asked what had 
happened, and the victim told police that Bryant had shot him. Id. At trial, the police officers testified 
as to what the victim told them. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the conviction in light of 
Davis since the victim’s statements were made in response to police interrogation, the victim was 
unavailable, and the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the victim. Id. at 1151. The 
Supreme Court, however, reversed the Michigan court and found the victim’s statements to be 
nontestimonial. Id. at 1167. 
 157. Id. at 1159. 
 158. Id. at 1158. In particular, the Court in Bryant considered relevant that the victim had been 
injured, the crime involved the use of a gun, and that the shooter was still at-large. Id. at 1163–64. The 
Court compared the case with Hammon, where the perpetrator was only armed with his fists, and 
therefore removing the victim to another room ended any potential emergency. Id. at 1158. Also 
relevant was the victim’s medical condition. Id. at 1159 (“The medical condition of the victim is 
important to the primary purpose inquiry to the extent that it sheds light on the ability of the victim to 
have any purpose at all in responding to police questions and on the likelihood that any purpose 
formed would necessarily be a testimonial one. The victim’s medical state also provides important 
context for first responders to judge the existence and magnitude of a continuing threat to the victim, 
themselves, and the public.”). 
 159. Id. at 1160. The questions asked in Bryant, though trying to establish past events, were the 
kind of questions designed to allow the police “to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, 
and possible danger to the victim.” Id. at 1165 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006)). 
The Court also considered the informality of the questioning more similar to the 911 call in Davis than 
the police station interview in Crawford. Id. at 1166. 
 160. See supra note 77. 
 161. See id. at 1158 (“Domestic violence cases like Davis and Hammon often have a narrower 
zone of potential victims involving threats to public safety.”). See also Paruch, supra note 70, at 138–
39. 
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emergency. As such, state courts have generally refused to apply Davis to 
the statements of child abuse victims,
162
 and otherwise treat child 
witnesses like any other for the purposes of the emergency doctrine. 
C. Giles Forfeiture Doctrine 
The common-law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing disallows 
defendants profiting from the unavailability of the prosecution’s witness if 
the defendant caused the witness to be unavailable and intended to cause 
the witness’s absence.163 Early Supreme Court cases recognized this 
doctrine as applicable in the context of the Confrontation Clause.
164
 In 
Giles v. California,
165
 the Court reaffirmed forfeiture as applicable under 
the Confrontation Clause after Crawford.
166
 However, the Court stressed 
the intent element of forfeiture and limited its application to where the 
defendant “engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from 
testifying.”167 If a defendant merely caused the absence of the witness but 
did not do so for the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying, the 
forfeiture doctrine does not apply and the defendant is still entitled to an 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witness.
168
  
 
 
 162. See, e.g., State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. 2006). In Justus, the Missouri Supreme Court 
found it was error for the trial court to admit a videotaped interview between a social worker and a 
young sex abuse victim. Id. at 881. The court rejected the notion that the child’s statements were made 
during an ongoing emergency and distinguished the case from Davis in that the child was not in any 
immediate danger, the statements were made in a hospital interview room, and the child appeared calm 
throughout the conversation. Id. These circumstances stood in contrast to the facts of Davis in which a 
domestic abuse victim, apparently speaking frantically, conversed with a 911 operator about how the 
defendant abused her and how he was still in the house. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–18. 
 163. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878). 
 164. See id. at 158–59. See also Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 472 (1900) (“The 
Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own 
wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he 
voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by 
his procurement, evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his 
constitutional rights have been violated.”). 
 165. 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 166. Id. at 359. 
 167. Id. at 361. 
 168. Id. In Giles, the Court provided an example of a murder case, in which the victim makes an 
accusatory statement prior to the crime. Id. at 361–62. There, forfeiture would not apply. Though the 
murderer caused the unavailability of the witness, the murder is not considered as intended to cause the 
absence of the witness at the defendant’s future murder trial for the very same victim, absent some 
evidence to the contrary. Id. 
 The facts of Giles fell under this category as well, and the Supreme Court overruled the 
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing there. Id. at 377. The defendant was on trial for the murder of 
his girlfriend, who weeks earlier had reported to the police death threats made by the defendant. Id. at 
356–57. The lower courts allowed police to testify as to those threats because the defendant had 
procured the absence of the witness. Id. at 357. The Supreme Court reversed based on the defendant’s 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
820 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:793 
 
 
 
 
Using child abuse cases as an example, Giles would require evidence 
that the defendant committed abuse for the very purpose of preventing the 
victim from testifying in the defendant’s later prosecution for child abuse. 
Though there are arguments to be made that abuse is often calculated to 
cause the unavailability of the child witness at trial,
169
 courts have 
generally rejected these claims.
170
 Evidence of the defendant’s intent to 
specifically discourage the child victim’s later testimony is often lacking. 
Again, child witnesses get no special treatment here. As a result, evidence 
of forfeiture has generally been rare in the context of child abuse 
prosecutions. 
V. RECONCILING THE LETTER OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE WITH ITS 
PURPOSE  
Herein lies the central concern of this Note. The Crawford testimonial 
hearsay standard treats child witnesses as adults.
171
 Defendants receive the 
same right of confrontation regardless of the witness’s age. Modern 
psychological research, however, teaches that children should be treated 
like children.
172
 State and lower courts have seemingly resolved this 
conflict—between constitutional rule and psychological research—in 
favor of strict application of the Crawford rule to child witnesses. The 
following Part examines whether, particularly in light of the Confrontation 
Clause’s purpose, that resolution is required under the Constitution.   
 
 
lack of specific intent to prevent his girlfriend from testifying at a later trial. Id. at 377.  
 169. See Lyon & Dente, supra note 79, at 1205–16 (arguing that forfeiture should apply in many 
child abuse cases because abusers tend to consciously select and “groom” victims who are unlikely to 
report). See also Laurie E. Martin, Note, Child Abuse Witness Protections Confront Crawford v. 
Washington, 39 IND. L. REV. 113, 140–42 (2005) (arguing that forfeiture should be applied broadly in 
child abuse cases due to the fear and embarrassment that abuse instills in its victims). 
 170. See, e.g., In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 616 (Ill. 2008) (finding a forfeiture claim 
lacking on the ground that “there is no indication that when respondent sexually assaulted [the victim], 
his assault was motivated in any way by a desire to prevent [the victim] from bearing witness against 
him at trial” and there was no indication that the “pinky swear” or threats to keep the abuse a secret 
were done in contemplation of a future trial); State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 793 (Kan. 2007) 
(rejecting the State’s argument that an act independent of the crime charged is not required where the 
defendant assaults a young child who is unlikely to be legally competent or capable of testifying at 
trial); People v. Burns, 832 N.W.2d 738, 747 (Mich. 2013) (finding that forfeiture did not apply where 
the prosecution presented no evidence that the defendant’s threats to his child abuse victim actually 
caused the child’s unavailability rather than the child’s general fear of testifying due to her young age).  
 171.  See supra Part IV. 
 172.  See supra Part III.B–E. 
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A.  The Case for Distinguishing Children from Adults Under the 
Confrontation Clause 
The policy argument for relaxing confrontation requirements as applied 
to child witnesses is clear. Cross-examination is developmentally 
inappropriate for many children.
173
 As research shows, children are 
generally more suggestible, less knowledgeable of the legal system, and 
less adept at testifying truthfully under pressure than adults.
174
 Subjecting 
child witnesses to the rigors of the adversarial system creates the 
opportunity for defense attorneys to confuse, intimidate, and influence said 
witnesses. While these concerns are present with adult witnesses,
175
 the 
still-developing minds of children— particularly of young children—make 
this risk even more acute. Common defense tactics, therefore, have the 
potential to not only expose the falsity in a child’s testimony but also to 
manipulate and induce false testimony from an otherwise truthful witness.  
A constitutional analysis of whether to permit child hearsay should 
consider these same policy concerns. The purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause is to ensure the reliability of evidence.
176
 By generally prohibiting 
child hearsay and requiring children to submit to cross-examination, the 
Crawford decision undercuts this very purpose. The difficulty with 
Crawford is not so much the testimonial standard itself; rather, Crawford 
is problematic because the Supreme Court there concerned itself with the 
wrong issues when it comes to child witnesses. Crawford requires 
confrontation categorically, while the Confrontation Clause’s purpose—
and its history as well—allow room for other considerations, such as the 
cognitive development of the witness.
177
 A purpose-driven approach to 
constitutional analysis should be appropriate where the strict application of 
a constitutional right would subvert the underlying purpose of that right. 
Indeed, the Court has recognized as much in other areas of constitutional 
criminal rights.  
B. A Purpose-Driven Constitutional Analysis 
For other constitutional rights of defendants, the Supreme Court has 
limited the scope of such protections by relying on the purpose of the right 
 
 
 173.  See supra Part III.B–E. 
 174.  See supra Part III.C–E. 
 175. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
 176.  See supra Part II.A. 
 177.  See supra Part II. 
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itself. Consider the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
178
 In Barker 
v. Wingo,
179
 the Supreme Court held that the right to a speedy trial is not 
absolute.
180
 Though the Court acknowledged a “general concern that all 
accused persons be treated according to decent and fair procedures,” 
certain “societal interests” often outweigh the interests of the defendant.181 
The Court identified these interests: 
The inability of courts to provide a prompt trial has contributed to a 
large backlog of cases in urban courts which, among other things, 
enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for pleas of guilty 
to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system. In addition, 
persons released on bond for lengthy periods awaiting trial have an 
opportunity to commit other crimes. . . . Finally, delay between 
arrest and punishment may have a detrimental effect on 
rehabilitation.  
. . . . 
 A second difference between the right to speedy trial and the 
accused’s other constitutional rights is that deprivation of the right 
may work to the accused’s advantage. Delay is not an uncommon 
defense tactic. As the time between the commission of the crime 
and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their 
memories fade.
182
 
While the Sixth Amendment, on its face, guarantees a speedy trial in all 
instances, the Court held that the Constitution countenances restricting this 
right where it no longer advances its purpose of protecting a defendant 
from unfair convictions.
183
 The Court was particularly concerned with 
defendants abusing this right to ensure an acquittal.
184
 The Barker 
decision, then, set forth a balancing test to determine when a speedy trial is 
required.
185
  
 
 
 178. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial . . . .”). 
 179. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
 180. Id. at 521–22. 
 181. Id. at 519. 
 182. Id. at 519–21 (citations omitted). 
 183.  Id. at 519–22. 
 184. See id. at 534–35 (“More important than the absence of serious prejudice, is the fact that 
Barker did not want a speedy trial. . . . Instead the record strongly suggests that while he hoped to take 
advantage of the delay in which he had acquiesced, and thereby obtain a dismissal of the charges, he 
definitely did not want to be tried.”) 
 185. Id. at 530 (“[W]e identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the 
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The Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process
186
 provides another 
example. The Compulsory Process Clause includes the right of defendants 
to present a defense and to have witnesses be heard by the trier of fact.
187
 
Again, this right is subject to limitations. In Taylor v. Illinois,
188
 the 
Supreme Court upheld a state court’s sanction imposed on a defendant for 
committing a discovery violation, even though the sanction precluded the 
accused from calling a defense witness.
189
 The purpose of compulsory 
process, according to the Court in Taylor, is “to vindicate the principle that 
the ‘ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were founded 
on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.’”190 However, the 
Court found that “[d]iscovery, like cross-examination, minimizes the risk 
that a judgment will be predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even 
deliberately fabricated testimony.”191 The trial court, then, could sanction 
the defendant for willful discovery violations—thereby restricting the 
defendant’s right to present a defense—because the purpose of 
compulsory process would otherwise be undermined.
192
 The risk that the 
defendant would present false evidence at trial made the exclusion of the 
defense witness constitutionally permissible.  
It is not merely the Sixth Amendment for which the Supreme Court has 
employed a purpose-driven analysis. In cases concerning the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule—the idea that evidence obtained through 
violations of the Fourth Amendment should be inadmissible at the 
defendant’s trial—the Court has similarly refused to apply the rule where 
its purpose was not advanced.
193
 Evidence obtained in violation of the 
 
 
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”). 
 186. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”). 
 187. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 
 188. 484 U.S. 400 (1988). 
 189. Id. at 416. The defendant violated the prosecution’s pretrial discovery motion by not 
disclosing two key witnesses until the second day of trial. Id. at 403. When questioned about this 
violation, the defendant’s attorney represented to the court that the witnesses had only recently been 
found. Id. at 403–04. An examination of these witnesses outside the presence of the jury revealed that 
defense counsel had fabricated this story. Id. at 404–05. 
 190. Id. at 411 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)). 
 191. Id. at 411–12. See also id. at 416 (“More is at stake than possible prejudice to the 
prosecution. We are also concerned with the impact of this kind of conduct on the integrity of the 
judicial process itself.”). 
 192. Id. at 409–10 (“The accused does not have the unfettered right to offer testimony that is 
incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under the standard rules of evidence. The 
Compulsory Process Clause provides him with an effective weapon, but it is a weapon that cannot be 
used irresponsibly.”). 
 193.  See generally Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139–42 (2009) (describing the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on when the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies). 
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Fourth Amendment is excluded only when the benefits of deterring police 
misconduct in the future outweigh the social costs of excluding valid 
evidence against a criminal defendant.
194
 For instance, in United States v. 
Leon,
195
 the Supreme Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule where 
police found evidence during an illegal search because the officers 
reasonably and in good faith relied on a faulty search warrant.
196
 Likewise, 
in Davis v. United States,
197
 the Court found that good-faith reliance by 
police on an outdated law did not warrant excluding illegally obtained 
evidence.
198
 In essence, since the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to 
deter intentional misconduct by police, whether evidence is excluded 
depends on the culpability of the police involved.  
These examples show that a purpose-driven constitutional analysis is 
not foreign to the Supreme Court. At times, enforcing a constitutional 
provision would be contrary to its underlying purpose, and the Court has 
not hesitated to restrict constitutional rights in those instances. Certainly, 
comparison between different types of rights is imperfect, and the Court’s 
approach in the above cases may be unique to those circumstances.
199
 
Nonetheless, the concern of hindering the fact-finding purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause through the cross-examination of child witnesses is 
analogous. 
C. A Caveat: How Far Is Too Far? 
That an argument can be made for constitutionally allowing the 
admission of child hearsay without confrontation does not answer whether 
confrontation requirements should be relaxed as to child witnesses. Simply 
put, the Confrontation Clause’s goal of ensuring reliable evidence is not an 
end unto itself. Reliable evidence certainly advances the fact-finding 
function of criminal trials, but, perhaps more importantly, it allows 
defendants to fully put the government to its burden and protects the 
 
 
 194. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347–48 (1974). 
 195. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 196. Id. at 922. 
 197. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 198. Id. at 2429. 
 199. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972) (“The right to a speedy trial is 
generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the 
accused.”); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (“There is a significant different between the 
Compulsory Process Clause weapon and the other rights that are protected by the Sixth Amendment—
its availability is dependent entirely on the defendant’s initiative.”); United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the exclusionary rule as a prophylactic, remedial measure which 
should only be applied when its objectives are advanced). 
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accused from wrongful convictions.
200
 For child witnesses, the same 
developmental immaturity that makes children suggestible on the stand 
also presents a great risk for fabrication or coaching before trial.
201
 Cross-
examination of the child witness may be the defendant’s one opportunity 
to expose this falsity to the jury. Doing away with confrontation of child 
witnesses is particularly impactful when there is no other corroborating 
evidence.
202
 
The previously mentioned child abuse scandals at day care centers 
across the United States during the 1980s are perhaps the best illustration 
of the potential virtues of confronting child witnesses.
203
 During the 
summer of 1983, a mother in Manhattan Beach, California reported to the 
police that staff at the McMartin Preschool had sexually assaulted her son, 
then two-and-a-half years old.
204
 A panic ensued, and hundreds of other 
parents brought their children to a child abuse treatment center for 
interviewing.
205
 Before long, 350 other children had alleged being abused 
at the McMartin Preschool,
206
 with claims ranging from the disturbing to 
the absolutely bizarre.
207
 Though no corroborating evidence of abuse was 
ever found, charges were brought against the owners and staff of 
McMartin Preschool,
208
 and a well publicized, six-year prosecution 
followed.
209
 Scandals elsewhere in the country followed a similar 
pattern.
210
 
 
 
 200. See supra Part II.A. 
 201. See generally Montoya, supra note 75 (recounting examples of cases in which pretrial 
interviewing of child witnesses appeared to influence their testimony); John S. Shaw, III & Kimberley 
A. McClure, Repeated Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629 (1996) (conducting a study in which participants who were repeatedly 
questioned about an event over the course of five weeks reported higher confidence in their testimony; 
in fact, their testimony was no more accurate than those who were not repeatedly questioned). 
 202. Indeed, that is the case with most child sexual abuse prosecutions. See supra note 77. 
 203.  See supra note 74. 
 204. Robert Reinhold, Collapse of Child Abuse Case: So Much Agony for So Little, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 24, 1990, at A1. 
 205. Id.  
 206. MCGOUGH, supra note 74, at 8. 
 207. Allegations included that the teachers forced children to play “The Hollywood Game” or 
“Naked Movie Star” where children were photographed and videotaped while the staff sexually 
molested them, Robert Lindsey, Boy’s Responses at Sex Abuse Trial Underscore Legal Conflict, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1985, at 14; that teachers slaughtered class pets in front of the children in order to 
ensure their silence, Marcia Chambers, 7 Ordered to Stand Trial in Child Sex Abuse Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1986, at A8; and that teachers performed and forced children to participate in satanic 
rituals in which the class drank the blood of the slaughtered animals and teachers magically flew 
around the room like witches. Reinhold, supra note 204. 
 208. MCGOUGH, supra note 74, at 8. 
 209. Reinhold, supra note 204. 
 210. MCGOUGH, supra note 74, at 8–13. 
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At trial, the defense exposed the incredibility of these allegations by 
aggressively cross-examining the child accusers. Defense counsel did so 
by employing some of the same tactics found ill-suited for child witnesses: 
lengthy cross-examination,
211
 repeated questioning,
212
 complex 
questions,
213
 and leading questions.
214
 Nonetheless, the defense 
successfully convinced a jury, particularly since other evidence was 
lacking, that the wild claims of hundreds of children were likely grounded 
in suggestive interviewing by parents and therapists rather than fact.
215
 
Without cross-examination, the McMartin defendants may not have been 
able to expose this coaching, and innocent persons would have been 
wrongly convicted. Though most cases are likely less fantastical, the 
opportunity for confrontation can be just as important.  
D. Alternative Solutions 
There are, perhaps, more functional answers to the suggestibility 
problem posed by child witnesses—ones that need not be addressed by the 
Confrontation Clause. From a practical standpoint, the aggressive cross-
examination of children seen in the McMartin Preschool case may be 
impractical in most cases. Defense attorneys may strategically refrain from 
acting hostile towards child witnesses as to avoid a negative reaction from 
the jury.
216
 Judges and prosecutors can also play a role to ensure both 
confrontation and reliable testimony. Rules of evidence generally give 
judges the power to control the scope and manner of cross-examination.
217
 
 
 
 211. One witness was subjected to cross-examination for seventeen days by the defense. Reinhold, 
supra note 204. 
 212. Child’s Testimony Disputed in the McMartin Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1987, at D23. 
 213. Reinhold, supra note 204. 
 214. Lindsey, supra note 207. 
 215. Reinhold, supra note 204. Following the defendants’ acquittal, the verdict was widely seen as 
the correct one. Id. A full-length, made-for-television movie based on the McMartin case was released 
in 1995 and similarly portrayed the allegations as hysterical and unfounded. See INDICTMENT: THE 
MCMARTIN TRIAL (HBO Pictures 1995). 
 216. See Evans, Lee & Lyon, supra note 78, at 259–62 (finding that the more complex questions 
defense counsel asks of a child witness, the more likely a jury is to convict the defendant); Zajac, 
O’Neill & Hayne, supra note 87, at 192 (suggesting that mock jurors tend to be sympathetic to 
children undergoing cross-examination). Courts have recognized this as a legitimate defense strategy 
as well; for example, the failure of defense counsel to aggressively cross-examine child witnesses does 
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, but rather represents a conscious, calculated decision to 
not risk angering the jury. See, e.g., Rodgers v. State, 113 So.3d 761 (Fla. 2013); Geralds v. State, 111 
So. 3d 778 (Fla. 2010); McCullough v. State, 973 N.E.2d 62 (Ind. App. 2012); McKenna v. State, 671 
A.2d 804 (R.I. 1996); Peterson v. State, 270 P.3d 648 (Wyo. 2012). 
 217. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (“The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and 
order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for 
determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue 
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Prosecutors can adapt their questioning styles, both before and during trial, 
to the needs of children and can better prepare their young witnesses for 
testifying in court.
218
 A number of studies have shown that jurors tend to 
sympathize with young witnesses, but jurors are also sensitive to the 
perceived suggestibility and immaturity of children as well.
219
 Judges and 
prosecutors should take note of these findings and use them to properly 
facilitate cross-examination of children where necessary. 
For decades, courts have employed special courtroom procedures for 
child witnesses. While the continuing validity of Maryland v. Craig
220
 has 
been questioned after Crawford,
221
 a number of post-Crawford state court 
cases have continued to uphold practices similar to one at issue in 
Craig.
222
 Many scholars have continued to advocate for child-friendly 
procedures that nonetheless preserve the opportunity to cross-examine the 
 
 
embarrassment.”). See also McLain, supra note 91, at 112 (advocating for judges to exercise their 
supervisory powers to preclude attorneys from using complex questions with child witnesses); 
Vandervort, supra note 10, at 360 (same). 
 218. See Michael E. Lamb et al., The Effects of Forensic Interview Practices on the Quality of 
Information Provided by Alleged Victims of Child Abuse, in CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY supra note 80, at 
137–140 (offering questioning techniques and suggestions for forensic interviewers on how to obtain 
more accurate responses from children and describing the research supporting those suggestions); 
Janet Leach Richards, Protecting the Child Witness in Abuse Cases, 34 FAM. L.Q. 393, 413–17 (2000) 
(describing the role of prosecutors in protecting child witnesses); Saskia Righarts, Sarah O’Neill & 
Rachel Zajac, Addressing the Negative Effect of Cross-Examination Questioning on Children’s 
Accuracy: Can We Intervene?, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 354, 360–61 (2013) (finding that warning 
children about the nature of cross examination can reduce the number of changes a child witness 
makes between direct examination and cross examination).  
 219. See Jodi A. Quas, William C. Thompson & K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, Do Jurors “Know” 
What Isn’t So About Child Witnesses?, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 425, 435–36 (2005) (surveying 
laypersons’ beliefs about the reliability of child testimony and comparing those beliefs to actual 
research findings); David F. Ross et al., The Child in the Eyes of the Jury: Assessing Mock Jurors’ 
Perceptions of the Child Witness, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 6–8 (1990) (citing research finding that 
jurors hold negative stereotypes of child witnesses, and are more sensitive to changes in their 
testimony, but nonetheless find them more credible); Casey W. Schmidt & John C. Brigham, Jurors’ 
Perceptions of Child Victim-Witnesses in a Simulated Sexual Abuse Trial, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
581, 601 (1996) (finding that young witnesses who testify confidently can actually appear more 
credible due to the contrary stereotype of child witnesses). 
 220.  497 U.S. 836 (1990). See also supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text. 
 221. See Thompson, supra note 136, at 290 (arguing that public policy and Supreme Court 
precedent allow for statutory exceptions to child testimony); Jennifer E. Rutherford, Comment, 
Unspeakable!: Crawford v. Washington and Its Effects on Child Victims of Sexual Assault, 35 SW. U. 
L. REV. 137, 154–55 (2005) (arguing that Craig was not overruled by Crawford because the Court did 
not address whether face-to-face confrontation was required). 
 222. See, e.g., State v. Arroyo, 935 A.2d 975 (Conn. 2007) (holding child’s testimony in a 
modified courtroom with one-way mirror, without the presence of the defendant, to be constitutional); 
State v. Stock, 256 P.3d 899 (Mont. 2011) (upholding use of two-way electronic audio–video 
communication for young child’s testimony). 
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witness.
223
 Despite concerns that these measures skew juror opinion or 
unduly prejudice defendants, the research has not borne out these fears.
224
 
Some scholars, still, have ignored concerns about the vulnerability and 
suggestibility of children and have argued that testifying is beneficial for 
child witnesses, particularly those who were victims of crime.
225
 In any 
event, psychological research will likely continue to develop and assess 
new child-friendly procedures for undergoing cross-examination to 
balance the rights of the defendant and the vulnerabilities of the witness.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Confrontation Clause should be applied with its underlying 
purpose—to ensure the reliability of evidence and to facilitate the fact-
finding function of criminal trials—at the forefront of the analysis. It is 
only logical that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause should not be 
subverted by its own strict adherence. The decades of research surveyed 
by this Note show that subjecting children to cross-examination risks 
doing just that. The suggestibility and immaturity of young children can 
lead to inaccurate testimony and manipulation by defense counsel. Though 
some scholars question whether the Supreme Court is retreating from its 
position in Crawford,
226
 the testimonial hearsay standard appears to be 
here to stay. But while the Crawford standard generally treats children as 
adults for purposes of confrontation, the history and purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause does not require this result. Based on this history 
and the psychological research available, it is arguably constitutionally 
permissible for courts to admit child hearsay without confrontation. Still, 
the challenges that child witnesses pose to the “greatest legal engine” do 
 
 
 223. See, e.g., MCGOUGH, supra note 74, at 189–232 (recording pre-trial interviews with 
children); Julie A. Buck, Kamala London & Daniel B. Wright, Expert Testimony Regarding Child 
Witnesses: Does It Sensitize Jurors to Forensic Interview Quality?, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 152, 
160–61 (2011) (expert testimony regarding the suggestibility of children); Righarts, O’Neill & Zajac, 
supra note 218, at 361–62 (pre-trial intervention); Rutherford, supra note 221, at 153–55 (two-way 
video technology). 
 224. See Gail Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit Technology 
on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 197–200 
(1998) (finding that use of closed circuit television to broadcast child testimony to courtroom did not 
affect jurors’ abilities to judge credibility of witness, nor did it prejudice jurors against defendant); 
Marsil et al., supra note 128, at 216–24 (summarizing research showing that shielding procedures for 
child witnesses do not prejudice defendants). 
 225. See Cooper, supra note 127, at 250 (citing research suggesting that children who testify at the 
trials of their abusers feel empowered and a greater sense of healing than those who do not testify). 
 226. See generally Shari H. Silver, Note, Michigan v. Bryant: Returning to an Open-Ended 
Confrontation Clause Analysis, 71 MD. L. REV. 545 (2012); Jason Widdison, Note, Michigan v. 
Bryant: The Ghost of Roberts and the Return of Reliability, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 230–35 (2012). 
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not lend themselves to a simple answer. Though cross-examination of 
children can jeopardize the accuracy of evidence at criminal trials, and 
constitutional doctrine should account for that risk, whether confrontation 
of child witnesses may nonetheless be desirable is another question 
entirely. 
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